【文/不雅察者网专栏作家 比利亚娜·万科夫斯卡，翻译/ 薛凯桓】
知名的弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）在最近一篇著作中，简要讲述了2024年这个“选举年”。事实上，统计数据知晓，本年大多数国度齐举行了某种模式的选举。我浏览了一下这篇著作，望望有莫得提到我的国度北马其顿（毕竟我是总统候选东谈主），但并莫得。
与大多数其他分析家一样，福山存眷的焦点是好意思国的“哈姆雷特式选举”。公民们会取舍唐纳德·特朗普照旧将成为首位女总统的副总统卡马拉·哈里斯？这似乎是好意思国和国际社会争论的焦点问题，似乎世界的行运取决于谁入主白宫。在全球危险四伏、全东谈主类有可能迎来灾难结局的时辰，这种情谊尤为热烈。关联词，尽管这一事件备受存眷，但并非通盘东谈主齐觉得它将决定通盘东谈主的行运。
上海复旦大学的张维为扶植提倡了一个道理的不雅点。他觉得这出好意思国大戏（或者不错称为好意思国悲催，因为这两个东谈主在政事上是唯独的取舍）反应了好意思国体制的时弊，其特质是仙葩化、南北极化、侮辱性和全民标签化。他还指出，这种情况在中国事弗成能发生的——不是因为中国事一党制国度，而是因为党内高层造就的遴聘经由相等严格，无论谁造就国度，齐能确保他们是在为公众利益处事方面久经磨砺的东谈主。
来自德黑兰的穆罕默德·马兰迪（Mohammad Marandi）扶植也发表了道理的挑剔，他提到《纽约时报》的一篇分析著作觉得伊朗参预以致径直干预好意思国选举。他说，伊朗东谈主毫不会赞成这两个“疯子”中的任何一个，因为他们齐雷同赞成种族死灭。
诺姆·乔姆斯基（Noam Chomsky）曾对好意思国两大政党有过一个知名的姿色：好意思国公民不得不在百事可乐和好吃可乐之间作念出取舍，这实在令东谈主致密。杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeffrey Sachs）最近在剑桥大学的一次演讲中，也抒发了雷同的不雅点，以致过犹不足。
他示意，诚然他传统上倾向于民主党，但他再也无法见原他们了，因为他们对乌克兰和巴勒斯坦问题——这一威逼全球和平与安全的两大危险负有径直包袱。然而，大多数东谈主——即使是在学术界——出于能够的气馁，会取舍他们觉得较轻的桀黠，而哈里斯似乎在受过扶植的东谈主当中占了上风。
我悯恻他们，也贯通他们，但令我恼火的是，他们以致还在好意思化较轻的桀黠（本体上，这仍然是桀黠——他们对此心知肚明）。我有一位在加利福尼亚州从事和平问题询查的共事，我在他的社交媒体个东谈主主页上对此发表了挑剔，扫尾却被取消了好友关系。表示，我轰动了他的神经，因为我的挑剔（天然我要为此谈歉，尽管这个国度在巴尔干半岛给咱们带来了好多灾荒）得到了他的一些粉丝的赞成。无论如何，与好意思国社会昔时的发展比较，这只是一个小插曲。
在这里咱们不难题出这样的论断：无论（选举）扫尾如何，齐将导致（好意思国的）正当性危险，并给仍是南北极分化的好意思国社会带来里面摇荡。我记起小布什获得第二任期时，尽管他执行了灾难性的计策，但咱们中的许多东谈主劝慰我方，觉得这是朝着结束那些弗成抓续的计策迈出的一步，也许亦然朝着帝国调谢迈出的一步。
巴西民调机构AtlasIntel发布的11月初七大扭捏州民调数据AtlasIntel
但这样的经由——就像开垦不同的世界次序一样——是漫长的，咱们耐久无法准确掂量这个经由何时或如何结束，以及会产生什么样的遵循……这些遵循将弗成幸免地以齐心圆的方式向外涟漪，从国度舞台延长到全球舞台。
熟谙好意思国政事的东谈主（在此我要再次提到杰弗里·萨克斯，他几十年来一直与政事精英们保抓着密切关系，受到他们的尊敬）齐知谈，尽管有这样多奇特景色，但好意思国总统并不是确切的职权中心。国度是由其他东谈主处分的，而公众存眷的是总统个东谈主和其性情特征。这种“民族安世界度”（一个西方学术观念，与“民主国度”相对立，通常被用于标签化或恶名化与西法民主不同的国度体制）或者说军工-媒体-学术复合体，恰是好意思国枯竭确切民主的根柢原因。
尽管好意思国事这个世界上最饱和的国度，其对于社会凝华力以及在人人福利等要道问题上的社会合同齐处于纷乱景况，但政府机构却能确保自身的活命和延续。仔细分析不难发现，拜登政府在许多方面只是延续了特朗普第一任期的计策。雷同，若是特朗普面前奏效，也很难指望他会带来任何要紧的、积极的变化，尤其是在轻视计策方面。
尽管民主党意志到了体制的裂痕和变革的必要性，但他们照旧想尽一切办法来保管这个功能失调的体制，以致不遗余力地对其进行军事化，乃至到了自我排除的集体歇斯底里的地步。就在大选前几天，他们还派出了一支强盛的军事特遣队去“保卫”以色列，仿佛交游是他们的挡箭牌，就像试图错误他们的竞争敌手一样（时常被拿出来说事）。我相识一些才高意广的民主党赞成者，他们对拜登和哈里斯的最新举动感到颓落，以致在问我方：这些东谈主到底还想不想赢？
关联词，好意思国扶植弗拉基米尔·戈尔茨坦（Vladimir Goldstein）等更耀眼的分析家，则不太存眷对选举的掂量和对赌，而是更介怀询查刻下厌烦背后的深层原因，即为什么选举自己仍是将近被视为一种安全威逼？
戈尔斯坦谈出了特朗普招引好意思国社会底层人人的奥密。在特朗普无数未经想考的言论中（通常来自一个一鳞半瓜的头脑），每个东谈主齐能听到我方想要的东西。最病笃的是，他所传递的信息能引起普通选民的共识，其中包括针对外侨的国度安全呼声、孤单办法、以好意思国自身为中心等议题，以及通货推广、住房稀缺、资助番国交游和国度的预算浪掷等问题。
戈尔斯坦收拢了普通好意思国东谈主的中枢逆境：为什么咱们要在国外干戈，而不是在国内再造茁壮？关联词，高薪聘任的、往往是伪人人的分析师们却坚抓觉得，好意思国有包袱进行国外干扰，而不应优先辩论国内事项。
图片起头：新华社
耐久以来，任何对此提倡质疑的东谈主，齐会被贴上法西斯办法者、狂热分子或是“无知人人”等标签。这种受精英办法驱使、被意志形态蒙蔽的解放办法伪民主精英，对特朗普或访佛东谈主物所体现的（民粹）反弹负有径直包袱。凡是还有一点知识，就还有东谈主会倾听盛怒者、被甩手者、失望者和底层穷东谈主的声息，重新辩论好意思国轻视和国内计策的优先事项——以免为时已晚。
好意思国的轨制就像一条陈腐的大蛇，在猎物气息的蛊惑下吞食着我方的尾巴，对自我排除的遵循熟视无睹。这种对职权和抑制的逸想压倒了感性判断，使系统堕入自我排除的轮回。有些东谈主觉得这会导致好意思国的自我排除；有些东谈主则觉得这是一个继续断的存一火轮回，但无论如何，扫尾齐不会太好。此次选举不会使好意思国成为一个更宜居、更体面的公民居住地，也不会出身一个更耀眼的全球政事参与者。相背，它只会成为好意思国悲催下一阶段的前奏。
帝国不会鸦雀无声地腐化，它们会试图挣扎、挣扎，并试图掌权到临了，扫尾往往会留住前门去虎，前门拒虎——领有浩大影响力的好意思国也不例外。它的里面分辨和南北极分化不问可知，但其全球影响力意味着其斗争弗成幸免地会影响到其国界除外的地区。跟着其他地区和大国的崛起，咱们目击了全球力量的重组变化，问题不仅在于好意思国的发展轨迹，还在于世界其他地区将如何接纳这些震荡，并重塑自身以作念出回话。
因此，无论咱们是否欢乐，咱们齐不单是是旁不雅者，而是深深地卷入了帝国调谢的动态发展之中。历史告诉咱们，帝国很少会欣然地插足暮夜。
英文原文：
In a recent article, (in)famous Francis Fukuyama briefly discusses 2024 as the "year of elections." Indeed, statistics show that this year, most countries have held some kind of election. I browsed through the article to see if there was any mention of my country Macedonia (after all I was a presidential candidate); in vain. Like most other analysts, Fukuyama focuses on the “Hamletian choice” in the U.S.
Will the citizens choose Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris, who would become the first female president? This appears to be the pivotal question in both American and international debates, as if the world’s fate hinges on the individual who enters the White House. This sentiment is particularly intensified in a time of global crisis, which threatens to bring about a tragic end for all humankind. However, while the event is of high interest, not everyone considers it to be decisive.
The rest of the world (the global majority) has already decided not to tie its fate to the chaos and political fervor in the U.S. Professor Zhang Weiwei from Fudan University in Shanghai offered an interesting perspective. He sees this American drama (or American tragedy, with these two figures posing as the only political options) as a reflection of the system’s weaknesses, characterized by spectacle, polarization, insults, and the labeling of entire populations.
He rightly points out that such a scenario would be impossible in China—not because it's a one-party state, but because the selection process for high party leadership is so rigorous that, whoever heads the country, it’s assured that they are someone proven in serving the public good.
Professor Mohammad Marandi from Tehran also offered an interesting comment, referring to a New York Times analysis that suggested Iran was rooting for or even meddling in American elections. He remarks that Iranians would never favor either of these “maniacal figures,” as both equally support genocide.
It’s hard to envy American citizens for having to choose between Pepsi and Coca-Cola, as Noam Chomsky once famously described the two major parties. In a recent talk at Cambridge, Jeffrey Sachs echoed the same sentiment, even taking it a step further. He stated that although he’s traditionally leaned toward the Democrats, he can no longer forgive them, as they are directly responsible for the two major crises threatening global peace and security: Ukraine and Palestine.
But most people—even within academia—out of sheer desperation, choose what they perceive as the lesser evil, and it seems Kamala has the edge among the educated.
I sympathize with them, I understand them, but what irritates me is the need to beautify even the lesser evil (which, in essence, remains evil—and they know it well). I commented on this on a California peace studies colleague’s social media profile—and ended up getting unfriended.
Apparently, I hit a nerve, as my comments (apologizing, of course, for interfering in another country's elections, though that country has caused us plenty of grief here in the Balkans) began receiving support from some of his followers. Anyway, this is a minor episode compared to what lies ahead for American society.
It’s not hard to conclude that whatever the outcome, it will lead to a legitimacy crisis and internal instability in an already polarized society. I recall when George W. Bush won his second term, despite the disastrous policies he pursued. Many of us consoled ourselves, thinking that this was a step toward ending those unsustainable policies and perhaps a step closer to the fall of the Empire.
But such processes—just like the building of a different world order—are lengthy, and we can never predict with certainty when or how they will conclude. And with what consequences... which will inevitably ripple outward in concentric circles, from the national to the global stage.
Those familiar with American politics (and here I’ll again mention Jeffrey Sachs, a man who has spent decades closely connected with, or respected by, the political elite) know that, despite all the spectacle, the U.S. president is not the true center of power.
The country is managed by others while the public focuses on personalities and character traits. This “national security state” or the military-industrial-media-academic complex is the very reason for the lack of genuine democracy. Although social cohesion is in disarray, along with the social contract on key issues of public welfare in one of the world’s wealthiest nations, the apparatus that governs ensures its own survival and continuity.
A closer analysis would easily reveal how, in numerous ways, the Biden administration has simply extended Trump’s policies from his first term. Likewise, it’s hard to expect that if Trump wins now, he would bring any significant (positive) changes, especially in foreign policy.
Although aware of the fractures in the system and the necessity for change, the Democrats have done everything possible to sustain this dysfunctional system, even to the point of a self-destructive collective hysteria with their relentless militarization.
Just days before the election, they’re sending a strong military contingent to “defend” Israel, as if war were their trump card, just as attempted attacks on their rival candidate were. I know respected Democrat supporters who are disheartened by Biden and Harris’s latest moves and are even asking themselves: do these people even want to win?
However, wiser analysts, such as American professor Vladimir Goldstein, focus less on predictions and bets and more on examining the deeper reasons behind the current climate—namely, why the election itself is perceived almost as a security threat. Goldstein speaks to the secret of Trump’s appeal to the lower social classes in American society.
Amid the flood of unfiltered statements from Trump (often from a fragmented mind), each person hears what they want. Above all, his messages that resonate with the average voter include calls for national security against migrants, an isolationist, self-centered agenda, and issues like inflation, housing scarcity, and budget drain for funding foreign wars and countries.
Goldstein captures the core dilemma of the average American: why do we fight wars abroad instead of securing prosperity here at home? Yet well-paid, often pseudo-expert analysts insist that the U.S. has a duty to intervene overseas, dismissing domestic priorities.
Anyone who questions this has long been labeled a fascist, a fanatic, or simply part of the “ignorant masses.” This liberal, quasi-democratic elite—driven by elitism and blinded by ideology—is directly responsible for the backlash embodied by Trump or similar figures.
If there was even a shred of common sense left, someone might listen to the voices of the angry, the abandoned, the disappointed, and the poor at the bottom, and reconsider the priorities of both foreign and domestic policy—before it’s too late.
The American system is ensnared, resembling the ancient Ouroboros, a serpent that, lured by the scent of its prey, consumes its own tail, oblivious to the self-destructive consequences. This lust for power and control overrides rational judgment, trapping the system in a self-defeating cycle. Some see this as leading to self-destruction; others view it as an endless cycle of life and death. Either way, the outcome is grim.
Tomorrow’s election won’t turn the U.S. into a more livable, decent place for its citizens, nor will it produce a more sensible global player. Instead, it will serve merely as a prelude to the next phase of the American tragedy.
Empires do not fade quietly; they thrash, resist, and attempt to hold on to power until the end, often leaving devastation in their wake. The United States, with its vast influence, is no exception. Its internal fractures and polarizations are evident, yet its global reach means that its struggles inevitably affect regions far beyond its borders.
As we witness shifts in global power, with other regions and powers rising, the question becomes not only about the trajectory of the U.S. but about how the rest of the world will weather these tremors and reshape itself in response.
Thus, we are not just spectators but are deeply involved, whether we like it or not, in the unfolding dynamics of a declining empire. And as history has shown us, empires rarely go quietly into the night.
